So, one of the really interesting things to me about this approach is that it offers the same asymmetric value proposition that cheap attack drones do to modern pre-drone IADS.
That is: this is a platform that costs 10-15k, and an AGM-88 of modern manufacture costs almost 900k, and a Kh-31 costs about 550k - and, just as importantly, both require a long time to manufacture. So, you could theoretically make a moderately large distributed array sprinkled over a few square kilometers, and even if they’re ALL turned on, it quickly becomes logistically infeasible to knock them all out without spending a silly quantity on antirad munitions, as well as massively attriting your stocks of antirad munitions. And if you turn like 10-25% of them on at a time and cycle through your array, the problem becomes even harder for the attacker. And if you have some sort of process or mechanism - like, oh I don’t know, figuring out how to do light aerial transport with cargo drones, or even figuring out how to mount these distributed array nodes on the drones themselves, and some sort of lightweight tether for providing power - the problem becomes a MASSIVE pain in the ass for an adversary (especially that last idea, which introduces z-axis and immediate maneuverability, such that the array could feasibly detect and altogether avoid an incoming antirad munition).
And that’s the paradigm of modern warfare - not just drones, but also networked and attritable systems that maintain functionality when elements are taken offline
adding to this. I imagine that the emitter by itself costs a fraction, so set-up a huge array of these dumb emitters, and a few active systems randomly within that array. You’d essentially create an interdiction zone.
You’d end up jamming yourself. You can’t really have radars or other strong electromagnetic warfare devices near each other operating on the same frequency since they tend to interfere and wash out each other’s signals.
As a decoy makes sense though since you can send them far away on a drone or something.
I think this is just the wrong intuition. Not a faulty one, but one which is mostly the same as the doctrine which is being exposed as entirely ineffective.
US military doctrine is the “towards complexity” doctrine such that your opponent also needs to follow you into complexity. This worked for the US in the post WWII era because it was coupled with an exponentially increasing economic output.
Whats being show, as doctrine, is “away from complexity” and “towards distributed” approach to warfighting ends up being far more effective.
So coming from, practically, 100 years of “more advanced more complicated technology and approaches are better” being doctrine, its understandable to want to add complexity to systems.
So, one of the really interesting things to me about this approach is that it offers the same asymmetric value proposition that cheap attack drones do to modern pre-drone IADS.
That is: this is a platform that costs 10-15k, and an AGM-88 of modern manufacture costs almost 900k, and a Kh-31 costs about 550k - and, just as importantly, both require a long time to manufacture. So, you could theoretically make a moderately large distributed array sprinkled over a few square kilometers, and even if they’re ALL turned on, it quickly becomes logistically infeasible to knock them all out without spending a silly quantity on antirad munitions, as well as massively attriting your stocks of antirad munitions. And if you turn like 10-25% of them on at a time and cycle through your array, the problem becomes even harder for the attacker. And if you have some sort of process or mechanism - like, oh I don’t know, figuring out how to do light aerial transport with cargo drones, or even figuring out how to mount these distributed array nodes on the drones themselves, and some sort of lightweight tether for providing power - the problem becomes a MASSIVE pain in the ass for an adversary (especially that last idea, which introduces z-axis and immediate maneuverability, such that the array could feasibly detect and altogether avoid an incoming antirad munition).
And that’s the paradigm of modern warfare - not just drones, but also networked and attritable systems that maintain functionality when elements are taken offline
adding to this. I imagine that the emitter by itself costs a fraction, so set-up a huge array of these dumb emitters, and a few active systems randomly within that array. You’d essentially create an interdiction zone.
You’d end up jamming yourself. You can’t really have radars or other strong electromagnetic warfare devices near each other operating on the same frequency since they tend to interfere and wash out each other’s signals.
As a decoy makes sense though since you can send them far away on a drone or something.
You can if they’re all synced up together
I think this is just the wrong intuition. Not a faulty one, but one which is mostly the same as the doctrine which is being exposed as entirely ineffective.
US military doctrine is the “towards complexity” doctrine such that your opponent also needs to follow you into complexity. This worked for the US in the post WWII era because it was coupled with an exponentially increasing economic output.
Whats being show, as doctrine, is “away from complexity” and “towards distributed” approach to warfighting ends up being far more effective.
So coming from, practically, 100 years of “more advanced more complicated technology and approaches are better” being doctrine, its understandable to want to add complexity to systems.