The Bitwarden security team identified and contained a malicious package that was briefly distributed through the npm delivery path for @bitwarden/cli@2026.4.0 between 5:57 PM and 7:30 PM (ET) on April 22, 2026, in connection with a broader Checkmarx supply chain incident. The investigation found no evidence that end user vault data was accessed or at risk, or that production data or production systems were compromised. Once the issue was detected, compromised access was revoked, the malicious ...
In a recent analysis, Adam Harvey found that among the 999 most popular crates on crates.io, around 17% contained code that do not match their code repository.
17%!
Let me rephrase this, 17% of the most popular Rust packages contain code that virtually nobody knows what it does (I can’t imagine about the long tail which receives less attention).
Given that he lied about the results of the analysis he is using to prove his point, I find it hard to trust anything in this article.
In the analysis, Harvey said only 8 repositories did not match their upstream repos. The other problems were issues like not including the VCS info, squashing history, etc.
EDIT: Also, I just noticed that he called it a “recent” analysis. It’s roughly a two year old analysis. I expect things have improved a bit since then, especially since part of the problem was packaging using older versions of Cargo.
Given that he lied about the results of the analysis he is using to prove his point, I find it hard to trust anything in this article.
In the analysis, Harvey said only 8 repositories did not match their upstream repos. The other problems were issues like not including the VCS info, squashing history, etc.
EDIT: Also, I just noticed that he called it a “recent” analysis. It’s roughly a two year old analysis. I expect things have improved a bit since then, especially since part of the problem was packaging using older versions of Cargo.