The Bitwarden security team identified and contained a malicious package that was briefly distributed through the npm delivery path for @bitwarden/cli@2026.4.0 between 5:57 PM and 7:30 PM (ET) on April 22, 2026, in connection with a broader Checkmarx supply chain incident. The investigation found no evidence that end user vault data was accessed or at risk, or that production data or production systems were compromised. Once the issue was detected, compromised access was revoked, the malicious ...
There are some good points in it, though I wouldn’t really consider go dependencies all that decentralized in practice and I don’t understand how checksum db will protect against supply chain attacks with stolen credentials, but I admit I haven’t looked into the details.
Yep you’re right, tampering before transmission is still possible. I think I agree with having a strong standard lib helping that considerably.
While the language of the blog is not objective, the “content” was better than expected 😊
Competent standard lib + decentralized libs + checksum db.
While the article is a bit theatralic, it offers important arguments.
There are some good points in it, though I wouldn’t really consider go dependencies all that decentralized in practice and I don’t understand how checksum db will protect against supply chain attacks with stolen credentials, but I admit I haven’t looked into the details.
Yep you’re right, tampering before transmission is still possible. I think I agree with having a strong standard lib helping that considerably. While the language of the blog is not objective, the “content” was better than expected 😊